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RESPONSES TO COMMENTARIES
SIX-TO-ONE GETS THE JOB DONE: COMMENTS ON THE REVIEWS
W. Joseph Wyatt and Donna M. Midkiff1
Marshall University
We are pleased to note that six of the seven responses to our article were marked by
approval, and/or thoughtful contemplation, regarding our central theses—that the
research said to support biological causation of mental disorders is relatively weak, and
that the claims of drug effectiveness are often overstated.
Richard F. Rakos (2006) put forth an interesting hypothesis—a belief in agency (free
will) may be genetically determined because it has survival value. A sense of autonomy
may function as a powerful primary reinforcer. As Rakos put it, this belief seems
unshaken by logic or evidence, an observation with which it is difficult to disagree.
On reflection, however, one must account for the fact that humans are quite often
eager to abandon agency, such as when they engage in inappropriate, illegal, unethical or
otherwise maladaptive behavior. On such occasions humans are often quick to blame
external factors (“The dog ate my homework”), rather than themselves. Perhaps what is
born into us is a gene for adoption of any position that is self-serving.
Rakos has thoughtfully analyzed the human tendency to attribute free will in doses
that correspond to functional level. The developmentally disabled are seen as more
appropriate targets for behavioral techniques because they are seen as possessing less free
will than those who function at a higher level.
Rakos takes note of the powerful influence of the pharmaceutical industry and asks
what is to become of behavior analysis in a society that is moving closer to Brave New
World than to Walden Two. He suggests that the nonscientific manner in which
syndromes are selected for inclusion in the DSM is not widely known, and adds that now
may be a good time for behavior analysts to work toward a new system of diagnostic
classification based upon functionally-defined problems. We agree, but remain somewhat
pessimistic due to the enormous power of the psychiatry and pharmaceutical industries
that likely will strongly resist such a move. At any rate Rakos recognizes that we have
presented, “…compelling reasons for behavior analysts to incorporate political activity
into our role definition.”
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Kurt Salzinger (2006) eloquently describes the state hospital of years gone by. We
both have worked full-time in a state hospital—the first author as far back as the 1970s.
Indeed, many changes have taken place. Like Rakos, Salzinger puts forth an interesting
hypothesis—in this case about a possible inborn disposition of schizophrenics to respond
to stimuli preponderantly in the immediate environment, to the exclusion of stimuli that
are more removed. We see no reason why that could not be the case, and the hypothesis
awaits confirmation. We tend to disagree, however, with Professor Salzinger’s assertion
that evidence for the biological model is much more compelling today than it has been in
the past. He cites the genome project and the, “…possibility of real breakthroughs…”
Certainly the possibility is there, but up to now the breakthroughs appear to be less the
products of the scientific enterprise than the culmination of the economic interests of the
medical and pharmaceutical industries.
It is suggested by Salzinger that we should view the biological model as a friend that
will make our procedures more powerful. Upon reading that we were put in mind of
Skinner’s frequently stated desire to see behavior analysis become a part of the science of
biology—a thoroughly natural science. In that context we agree wholeheartedly with
Salzinger.
Christopher G. Mitchell (2006) felt challenged to review the acceptance of
biological causation that he had acquired over the years. Thus, we have succeeded in one
of our goals. We have created a dialogue. Interestingly, in contrast to Professor Rakos
who considers that the biological model imbues the individual with a heightened sense of
autonomy, Dr. Mitchell holds the opposite view, that the biological model disempowers
patients in their efforts to change. We lean toward Mitchell’s position, but recognize the
intriguing and thoughtful discussion made by Rakos, as well.
Mitchell focused at some length on the adverse side effects of psychotropic
medications. Indeed, these are significant, and at times underplayed in drug company
advertisements. We agree with Mitchell’s conclusion that vast sums of money and battles
for territorial dominance leave our patients with the most to lose.
Judy Blumenthal (2006) nicely reviews the historic efforts to understand behavior,
including supernatural “explanations.” This is refreshing. We find it a healthy exercise
when, upon learning of some new causal hypothesis, to ask whether it is substantially
different from the witchcraft, zombies or multiple personalities to which Blumenthal
pointed. Too often the answer is no, although slick drug company advertisements, as well
as organized psychiatry’s position statements, frequently possess the language and
trappings of science and, as a result, have accrued greater face validity than have
explanations which invoke witches and zombies.
As Blumenthal cogently points out, drug companies are adept at using knowledge of
behavior to change it. The public is indeed bombarded by advertising about the effects of
medications, so much so that at times the people may be convinced that, for example,
school children are incapable of functioning properly without drugs.
We are encouraged to read Blumenthal’s endorsement of the notion that behavior
analysts must pass on their knowledge to the lay public. It is unfortunate that, with
exceptions of treatment of the developmentally disabled and a few other disorders, the
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public knows little about the field. Finally, Blumenthal presents several studies that have
recently been, or easily may be, featured in the media--a note of much needed optimism
for behavior analysts.
An interesting point on the usefulness of genetic explanations is provided by
Meredith Hanson (2006) who points out that much of what is considered “biological” in
social science research is actually a social construction. An example is the construct of
race/ethnicity which Hanson describes as “a cultural construct masking as biology.” It
may well be, as he points out, that an “environmental fit” best explains much behavior
earlier thought to be genetically determined. For example, the significance of skin color
tends to recede as a consequence of social interaction, Hanson notes. In rats, social
isolation creates heightened stress responses and probability of tumors. The thesis recalls
the brain’s plasticity and that experience changes neuroanatomy.
Hanson also points out the limitations of medications. He cites a recent study
showing that large numbers of patients simply quit taking medications, which suggests
that without accompanying psychosocial interventions, medication alone only weakly
serves to make life better for the majority of patients.
Dwight Harshbarger (2006) describes the parade of drug commercials that confront
anyone who views the nightly news (or almost any other hour of television, we might
add). Additionally, he notes the methodological inadequacies that render relatively
meaningless the findings of both twin studies and studies of brain structure and function.
Unlike the final reviewer (see below), Harshbarger understands that suspect research
practices, unwarranted underlying assumptions and overreaching interpretations (all of
which we described) have often gone unchallenged, and subsequently are lost, plowed
under in “the flood of dollars poured into drug marketing.”
Regarding that, he remarks on the failure of the scientific community to take a hard
look at the economic interests that bend scientific findings for private gain. We are
heartened to find that, like Harshbarger, most of our reviewers found some degree of
validity in our central theses. On a hopeful note, Harshbarger advises us that the
“behavioral blues” is not a permanent condition.

THE DISSENTER
In deciding how to respond to Professor Jerome C. Wakefield’s (2006) review we
were put in mind of efforts to latch onto a greased pig. The creature’s slippery condition,
combined with its tendency to dart hither and yon, render it nearly impossible to know
which part to grab first. However, we will address, in turn, a number of issues that were
raised by Professor Wakefield. Also we will point out instances in which his lengthy
review conveniently turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to our challenges to biological
causation theory.
Were one to read Wakefield’s review without having read our article, one might
well conclude that we had failed to provide evidence for our central contentions—that the
burgeoning acceptance (in the professional and popular cultures) of biological causation
of mental disorders goes well beyond the data, and that claims of drug effectiveness are at
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times overstated. Having considered his efforts to undo our positions on these two issues,
we conclude that Professor Wakefield’s Herculean efforts have come up quite short.
For example, in contrast to Wakefield’s assertions, consider what a number of
experts have said in reaction to just one frequently heard pharmaceutical advertising
claim—that a serotonin imbalance causes, or contributes to, depression (Lacasse & Leo,
2005):
• “Although it is often stated with great confidence that depressed people have a
serotonin or norepinephrine deficiency, the evidence actually contradicts these
claims.” Elliot Valenstein (1998), Professor Emeritus of Neuroscience.
• “A serotonin deficiency for depression has not been found.” Joseph Glenmullen
(2000), clinical instructor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School.
• “Some have argued that depression may be due to a deficiency of NE
(norepinephrine) or 5-HT (serotonin)…However, this is akin to saying that because a
rash on one’s arm improves with the use of a steroid cream, the rash must be due to a
steroid deficiency.” Psychiatrists Pedro Delgado and Francisco Moreno (2000), in the
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry.
• “I spent the first several years of my career doing full-time research on brain
serotonin metabolism, but I never saw any convincing evidence that any psychiatric
disorder, including depression, results from a deficiency of brain serotonin.” David
Burns (2003) winner of the A. E. Bennett Award given by the Society for Biological
Psychiatry for his research on serotonin metabolism.
• “Indeed, no abnormality of serotonin in depression has ever been demonstrated.”
Psychiatrist and former Secretary for the British Association for Psychopharmacology, David Healy (2004).
• “We have hunted for big simple neurochemical solutions for psychiatric disorders
and have not found them.” Psychiatrist Kenneth Kendler (2005), coeditor-in-chief of
Psychological Medicine.
Compare the above experts’ statements to drug company advertising for antidepressants:

•
•
•
•
•

“Celexa helps to restore the brain’s chemical imbalance…” (Forest Pharmaceuticals,
2005)
“LEXAPRO appears to work by increasing the available supply of serotonin…In
people with depression and anxiety, there is an imbalance of serotonin…” (Forest
Pharmaceuticals, 2005).
”When you’re clinically depressed…the level of serotonin…may drop…(T)o help
bring serotonin levels closer to normal, the medicine doctors now prescribe most
often is Prozac.” (Eli Lilly, 1998)
“Paxil…works to correct the chemical imbalance believed to cause (generalized
anxiety).” (GlaxoSmithKline, 2001)
“…depression may be related to an imbalance of natural chemicals…Zoloft works to
correct this…” (Pfizer, 2004)
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The gap between the researchers’ conclusions and drug company advertisements is
awesome. We stick to our contention that drug firms’ claims of biological causation have
routinely gone well beyond the data. At the polar opposite, Professor Wakefield has
written, “…I think by and large (Wyatt and Midkiff’s) contention is a myth…”
Of equal or greater interest is Wakefield’s gaping failure to address sections of our
article that tend to disconfirm his pro-biological causation position. The most revealing
example? In his review, the length of which approximated that of our paper, Wakefield
failed to mention the American Psychiatric Association’s collapse when it was
challenged (Mind Freedom, 2003) to produce any scientifically valid evidence to support
biological causation.
Wakefield also failed to address a number of other inconvenient facts. We cited
research (Kirsch, Moore & Scoboria, 2002) showing that many anti-depressant
medications are less effective than one might suppose. With an opportunity to comment,
Wakefield took a pass. Similarly we described psychiatry’s ongoing efforts to rebuff
intruder professions, and how the major arrow in psychiatry’s quiver became the
profession’s turn to biological causation. Again, Wakefield chose to leave that thorny
matter alone.
We documented the influence of drug company marketing upon doctors’ prescribing
practices (Kravitz, Epstein,Feldman, Franz, Azari, Wilks, Hinton & Franks, 2005), but
again Professor Wakefield seemed more interested in defending his point of view than in
accounting for the irritating facts. Likewise, we provided evidence for the enormous
increase in drug company marketing jobs since 1995 when direct-to-consumer
advertising became legal, and the parallel increase in prescribing of psychotropic
medications (Antonuccio, Danton & McClanahan, 2003). Again, rather than addressing
the facts, Wakefield chose silence.
We described methodological and interpretative problems that essentially render the
ubiquitously cited studies of identical twins (reared apart) of little value in establishing
genetic contributions to mental disorders. Evidently Wakefield agrees with us because he
counts those studies as, “…of limited value in the overall scheme of things…” Then, to
bolster his position, he cites an in-press article (Keller & Miller) that similarly fails to
account for the issues we raised. What Wakefield missed completely is that the evidence
he prefers (e.g., family studies not involving identical twins) suffers from the
environmental-genetic confounds that themselves gave rise to studies of monozygotic
twins reared apart.
Wakefield was dismissive of the data we presented to show that identical twins,
even if raised apart, will be treated rather similarly (in ways shown to contribute to
mental health) because of their identical physical attractiveness and identical rates of
developmental maturation. Likewise we presented evidence to show that both adoption
agencies and families frequently make special efforts to place adoptive children in homes
quite similar to their biological homes. These are variables that render the environments
of separated monozygotic twins quite similar. Despite our citation of a number of studies,
in a paroxysm of denial Wakefield wrote that we had offered, “…no evidence for (our)
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speculation…” that identical twins grow up in rather similar environments even though
they are reared apart.
There are other interesting aspects to Wakefield’s review. First is his focus upon
schizophrenia. Although we indeed mentioned schizophrenia, it wasn’t our focus, as we
addressed disorders more generally. However, upon reading his review one would get the
impression that we focused exclusively upon a single disorder.
Aside from the above aspects of Wakefield’s review, his special focus was upon the
(lack of) generalization of effectiveness of behavioral treatment, especially in studies of
schizophrenics. We agree that getting improvement within the hospital to generalize to
the community remains a work in progress for behavioral scientists. But that fact does not
undo the validity of behavioral treatment. The lack of generalization is caused by
discontinuation of the behavioral techniques, once the patient is discharged to the
community. That fact demonstrates that treatment is effective, not the reverse as
Wakefield implies.
There are other problems with Professor Wakefield’s efforts to defend both
biological causation and biological treatment by pointing to the issue of generalization of
behavioral treatment. Would Wakefield argue that exercise does not strengthen the body,
given that its benefits are lost when one stops exercising? Would Professor Wakefield
advise us to forego the annual flu shot simply because its benefits do not last forever?
The point here is that the transitory nature of improvement is not evidence that the
treatment has failed, as Professor Wakefield evidently believes.
Beyond that is Wakefield’s evident blind faith in psychotropic drugs, and the fissure
in his understanding of the causes of the reduction in mental hospital populations over the
past forty years. Wakefield reports with animation on “…the impressive results of
modern psychotropic medications…the fact is that it was chlorpromazine, not token
economies, that emptied the asylums…” There is truth to this. But there are two problems
with his analysis. First, “empty asylums” does not equal patients cured. Witness the
numbers of homeless former state hospital patients who wander the streets muttering to
themselves, or who now shuffle through the halls of group homes, little better in their
functioning than when in the “asylum.” Those poor souls are hardly good advertisements
for effectiveness of psychotropic medications.
Second, Wakefield seems unaware of the numerous factors other than medications
that have contributed to the vast reduction in numbers of hospitalized patients. Could
Wakefield be unaware that in the past forty years state after state has enacted tough
commitment laws that mandate probable cause hearings and routine reviews of patient
progress? Has he not learned of the availability of Social Security disability benefits
which enable many former “asylum” patients to qualify for placement in group homes
and supported living apartments? Does he not know of the rise of the community mental
health movement of the past forty years, and the fact that patients now have much greater
access to outpatient treatment? Could Wakefield not know of legislation nationwide that
has mandated deinstitutionalization of most patients? We have both worked full-time in a
large state hospital and have observed the impact of these factors up close. Wakefield did
not trouble himself to account for them, even though they have contributed as much, or
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more, than medications, when it comes to the reduction in numbers of hospitalized
patients.
Nor did Professor Wakefield account for another troubling fact—the absence of
generalization of drug treatment. An enormous number of former hospital patients simply
quit taking their medications. Usually they do so because of uncomfortable side effects.
A recent study published in the New England Journal of Medicine revealed the
percentage of patients who had quit taking their anti-psychotic medication by eighteen
months. The startling findings are: Trilafon--75% stopped taking the medication;
Zyprexa—64%; Seroquel—82%; Risperdal—74%; and Geodon—79% (Leiberman,
Stroup, McEvoy, Swartz, Rosenheck, Perkins, Keefe, Davis, Davis, Lebowitz, Severe &
Hsiao, 2005). In responding to our article, Professor Wakefield hitched his thesis to
problems in generalizaton of behavioral treatment. In fairness, he might have considered
the same issue with drug treatment, but he did not.
Clearly, Wakefield’s tangential attack on behavioral treatment does not qualify as an
undoing of our critique of the biological causation model. However, his response does
reveal Wakefield’s failure to understand essential behavioral principles. He is not alone.
Misrepresentations and misunderstandings of behavioral principles, techniques and
philosophy are common (Wyatt, Lamal, Newman & Hobbie, 1997). For example, he
accuses us of possessing, “…blind faith…in the existence of …unknown reinforcers that
somehow manage to maintain seemingly painful and heavily punished behavior…”
Similarly, elsewhere he asks, “Is it really possible that the reinforcers (are able to
maintain maladaptive behavior) despite the heavy toll in suffering and social stigma and
disapproval that psychotic symptoms usually incur…? The simple answer to Wakefield’s
wide-eyed question is yes. In fact, we are daily confronted with examples in which
maladaptive, stigma-producing, painful behaviors are maintained by other consequences.
For example, the stigma that accompanies obesity is intruded upon and
overwhelmed by the immediacy of the good taste of food. Community disapproval comes
with smoking, but the behavior is maintained by negative reinforcement as one’s
withdrawal symptoms are removed by lighting up. The social rejection accruing to a
tantruming adult (intermittent explosive disorder) is not the only consequence. Such fits
of temper are reinforced when the tantrum thrower gets his way. An ObsessiveCompulsive ritual is maintained by the reduction in anxiety that results when it is
performed, even though it may greatly disrupt one’s life. An irrational fear of heights
may cause the sufferer to race from the third floor to the ground level, with the result that
the action is negatively reinforced by the resulting feeling of relief, notwithstanding the
disruption to the client’s lifestyle. Hallucinations and other bizarre behaviors may well be
maintained by withdrawal of demands, or reinforced by kindly attention, or triggered by
the doctor’s suggestion, “Are you hearing voices today?” These are common examples,
yet Wakefield evidently has never heard of them.
Several times in his review Wakefield accuses us of possessing blind faith in our
position. But when we critiqued the “unbalanced neurotransmitter” theory of depression,
Wakefield responded weakly saying, “…that does not mean that schizophrenia and major
depression do not involve other biological problems.” We agree that such is possible.
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However, Wakefield then provides no evidence or other indication about what those
hypothetical other phenomena might be. Additionally he describes, “…the impressive
results of modern psychotropic medications…” but seems unimpressed with the growing
number of studies suggesting that much, though not all, of the effects of medications are
placebo related. For example, when data from the published and unpublished trials of
SSRI anti-depressants were pooled, the placebo was found to have accounted for about
80% as much improvement as the anti-depressant (Kirsch, Moore & Scoboria, 2002).
It gets worse as Wakefield attempts to prove his case with statements such as, “the
resurgence of the biological view is based on traditional prima facie inferences about
biologically designed normal human capacities across expectable environments, plus
persuasive contextual evidence (i.e., the kind we commonsensically use when judging
that blindness or paralysis is a disorder even when we know nothing about physiology of
the eye or musculature), plus a failure of all suggested alternative theories…to reach a
minimal threshold of plausibility. In particular, the relative independence of psychotic
symptoms from environmental change and intervention suggest(sic) an internal cause…”
However, Wakefield’s speculation is easily undone when one considers that primary
reinforcers (and many secondary reinforcers) are the same across settings. If a patient’s
best method of getting his parents, neighbors or treating professionals to cease their
demands (for example, demands that he engage in useful activity) is to create a psychotic
disturbance, it is likely to be reinforced across settings. The exception of a well-designed
token economy in which such behavior is not reinforced tends to prove the rule.
Professor Wakefield’s reliance upon blind faith is evident elsewhere as he maintains,
“…most observers through history have been persuaded of the biological position.” That
is not evidence. Does Professor Wakefield believe in UFOs? Most Americans are
convinced of their existence. Likewise, at one time most observers were convinced that
the earth was flat. Popularity of a point of view is not evidence of its validity, as
Wakefield would have us believe.
Wakefield accuses us of, “…abandoning parity of reasoning…” We reject that
assessment. We have adduced a body of evidence to support our central theses that were
stated at the beginning of our article: The research in support of biological causation is
weaker than one would expect given its increased acceptance over the past three decades,
and there are reasons to think that the claims of drug effectiveness are overstated,
especially by the pharmaceutical industry.
Wakefield’s preference for pejorative language (“pseudoscientific,” “verbal
gymnastics”) to describe our efforts seem weak and leaden methods by which to critique.
His style and absent substance remind one of the political conservative’s misguided
efforts to deny the existence of global warming.
His concluding section was revealing in another way. It contained his charge that
we, “…cite politics and other unscientific considerations in defending (our) position…”
But that was our point exactly. Politics, psychiatry’s war against “intruder professions,”
and the financial interests of the drug industry—all are non-science factors that have
contributed to the resurgence of the biological causation model over the past several

229

SIX-TO-ONE GETS THE JOB DONE

decades. We have elucidated the inconvenient facts, and in response Professor Wakefield
seems to cry, “No fair.”
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